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Abstract In this paper, I argue that the relationship between belief and credence is
a central question in epistemology. This is because the belief-credence relationship
has significant implications for a number of current epistemological issues. I focus
on five controversies: permissivism, disagreement, pragmatic encroachment, dox-
astic voluntarism, and the relationship between doxastic attitudes and prudential
rationality. I argue that each debate is constrained in particular ways, depending on
whether the relevant attitude is belief or credence. This means that (i) epistemolo-
gists should pay attention to whether they are framing questions in terms of belief or
in terms of credence and (ii) the success or failure of a reductionist project in the
belief-credence realm has significant implications for epistemology generally.
Keywords Belief  Credence  Permissivism  Uniqueness  Disagreement 
Pragmatic encroachment  Doxastic voluntarism  Prudential rationality
1 Introduction
Sometimes, we simply believe things. I believemy car is in the parking lot outside, that
1 ? 1 = 2, and that my coffee is getting cold. Belief is the attitude of taking some
proposition to be the case or representing it as true. Belief is a categorical attitude in
the sense that it is not degreed; either one believes a proposition or one does not.1 There
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are three belief-like attitudes one can take toward a proposition p; one can believe p,
one can withhold belief with respect to p, and one can disbelieve p (which is usually
assumed to be the same as believing not-p). For example, I withhold belief that there
are an even number of hairs on my head, and I disbelieve that the Cavs won the 2018
NBA finals.
However, sometimes our attitudes are more complex than simple beliefs. While I
am roughly 100% confident that 1 ? 1 = 2, I am closer to 99% confident my car is
in the parking lot outside, and more like 50% confident that a Republican candidate
will win the next US election. I will follow many epistemologists in calling this
second attitude credence. Credences are, in many ways, similar to the more
everyday attitude of confidence, and roughly correlate with the subjective
probability that some proposition is true. I will assume that, like beliefs, credences
are propositional attitudes,2 but unlike beliefs, they come in degrees. Because they
come in degrees, credences enable us to represent the world in a more fine-grained
way; I believe that 1 ? 1 = 2 and that my coffee is cold, but I have a higher
credence in the former than in the latter. Also unlike beliefs, credences (besides 0
and 1) don’t treat the proposition in question as given, but leave the possibilities
more open. A credence of 0.99 that it is raining leaves open the possibility that it is
not raining in a way that a belief it is raining does not.3
Recently, three views about the relationship between belief and credence have
emerged. The first is what one might call a credence-first view. On this view,
credence is the fundamental attitude, and belief is a species of credence. On one
version of this view, belief is the attitude of maximal credence, so belief is certainty
that some proposition is true.4 On another credence-first view, belief is not maximal
credence, but instead credence above some threshold, usually between 0.5 and 1.5
Footnote 1 continued
something like beliefs) come in degrees, but I will use the term ‘‘credence’’ here instead. For more on
whether beliefs come in degrees, see Moon (2017).
2 While I am assuming that both beliefs and credences are propositional attitudes, this is controversial.
For example, Moss (2018) holds that, rather than having propositional content, both beliefs and credences
have probability spaces as content. I adopt the propositional content view as a simplifying assumption,
but I do not think this is essential to my arguments.
3 Generally, I will assume a standard, mainstream philosophy of mind conception of both beliefs and
credences. On certain non-standard views of doxastic attitudes (e.g. the measure theory of mind [see Carr
(forthcoming)], and interpretativism [see Dennett (1978, 1987, 1991) and Davidson (1984)] some of the
points I make may not apply, or at least not apply in the ways I take them to apply. For example, given the
measure theory of mind, the attitude-content distinction is measure-system relative. On this view, there’s
no psychological difference between e.g. having probabilistic beliefs and having credences. However, the
distinction between probabilistic beliefs and credences is important for the points I make in this paper, so
some of my arguments may rule out non-standard views of doxastic attitudes.
4 For defenses and discussions of a credence-first view on which belief is maximal credence, see Levi
(1991), Roorda (1995), Wedgwood (2012), Clarke (2013), Greco (2015) and Dodd (2016). Note that it is
controversial on this view whether the attitude of certainty ought to be identified as credence 1.
5 For defenses and discussions of a credence-first view on which belief is less-than-maximal credence,
see Foley (1992, 1993, 2009), Hunter (1996), Bovens and Hawthorne (1999), Christensen (2004),
Weatherson (2005), Douven and Williamson (2006), Ganson (2008), Sturgeon (2008), Frankish (2009),
Chandler (2010), Smith (2010), Locke (2013), Dallmann (2014), Pettigrew (2015a, b), Leitgeb
(2013, 2014), Dorst (2017) and Lee (2017a, b).
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Either way, on this view, believing is ultimately a matter of having a particular kind
of credence.
A second view of the relationship between belief and credence is the belief-first
view.6 On this view, belief is the fundamental attitude and credence is a species of
belief. The fine-grained/numerical features of credence are built into the content of
what is believed. On one version of this view, credences are beliefs with
probabilistic content. A 0.99 credence it is raining is actually just the belief the
probability it is raining is 0.99; a 0.5 credence the coin will land heads is a belief
with the content the probability the coin will land heads is 0.5. However, it is worth
noting that the content need not be about probabilities per se; it could instead
involve epistemic modals or some other kind of numerical structure. What is central
to the belief-first view, however, is that the numerical structure is part of the content
rather than part of the attitude, and the relevant attitude is simply belief.7
A third view iswhat some have called pluralism or dualism; on this view, both belief
and credence are equally fundamental.Wehave both attitudes and neither is reducible to
the other. This view is more complex, but proponents of dualism maintain it can
nonetheless better explain our epistemological concepts and mental lives. On some
versions of dualism, belief and credence are two different epistemic tools that we use for
different purposes. The dualist view has recently been growing in popularity, and there
have been both philosophical and psychological arguments proposed for dualism.8
The thesis of this paper is that the relationship between belief and credence is a
central issue for epistemology. Specifically, I will consider each of the above views:
belief-first, credence-first, and dualism, and argue that each view has significant
implications for other debates in epistemology.9 If I am right, thenwhether a reduction
in the belief-credence realm is successful is a significant and pivotal question in
epistemology. Further, epistemologists ought not slide between attitudes, and should
be careful making an argument considering only one attitude and then taking their
argument to generalize. For example, an argument for permissivism about credence
may not entail permissivism about belief; one ought not assume one has established
permissivism is true if one has only argued for permissivism about credence.
I will focus on five debates: whether evidence can be permissive (Sect. 2), how
we ought to respond to disagreement (Sect. 3), whether our practical interests can
affect the epistemic rationality of doxastic attitudes (Sect. 4), whether we have
control over our doxastic attitudes (Sect. 5), and the relationship between prudential
6 For defenses and discussions of belief-first, see Harman (1986, 2008), Lance (1995), Holton (2008, 2014)
Plantinga (1993: Chapter 1), Easwaran (2015), Moon (2018, forthcoming) and Jackson and Moon (MS).
7 Although this may not be sufficient for a belief-first view. For example, Moss (2018) argues for a
simple-attitude, complex-content account of both beliefs and credences, but her view is not a belief-first
view. See Footnote 2.
8 For defenses and discussions of dualism, see Pollock (1983, 1994), Adler (2002: 9.1), Frankish (2004),
Hawthorne (2009), Sosa (2011: Chapter 4), Weisberg (2013, forthcoming), Friedman (2013a), Ross and
Schroeder (2014), Buchak (2014), Littlejohn (2015), Pettigrew (2015b), Carter et al. (2016) and Staffel
(2017, 2018, forthcoming).
9 See Hajek and Lin (2017) for an important complementary paper. They examine points of connection
and disconnection between formal and traditional epistemology and consider some of the same debates I
consider, such as pragmatic encroachment and the role of belief and credence in rational action.
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rationality and doxastic attitudes (Sect. 6). For each controversy, I will show that
belief-first, credence-first, and dualism constrain the debate—sometimes, in radical
ways. I conclude with some upshots and suggestions for further research (Sect. 7).
Two caveats before I begin. First, I am not arguing for a particular view of the
relationship between belief and credence. Instead, I am exploring what each view
would say about other debates in epistemology. This paper involves many
conditional claims; I will leave it to the reader to draw her own conclusions. Second,
these controversies are complex and multi-faceted, and most of them have a large
and growing literature. There are many implications that I will not have space to
cover in this paper. Nonetheless, I hope my discussion will at least suffice to show
the centrality of the belief-credence question for each debate in epistemology. This
paper will point to many places in which further research is needed.
2 Permissivism
2.1 Permissivism and uniqueness
The permissivism debate is about whether there is ever any slack between a body of
evidence and what it is epistemically rational to conclude, given that evidence.
Permissivism is the view that, sometimes, for a proposition and a body of evidence,
there is more than one rational doxastic attitude.10 For example, a permissivist might
hold that two people could have all the same evidence about whether God exists—e.g.
they both know about the cosmological and ontological arguments and are both aware
of the problem of evil and the problem of divine hiddenness. Nonetheless, it is at least
possibly true that, e.g. one rationally believes God exists and the other is rationally
agnostic. Or one might have a higher credence than the other without compromising
rationality.11 Thus, a permissivist maintains that one’s body of evidence does not
always rationally oblige one to hold a certain doxastic attitude toward a proposition.
Defenders of uniqueness deny this: uniqueness is the view that, for every body of
evidence and proposition, there is always a single rational doxastic attitude.12 In
response to the above example regarding belief in God, a proponent of uniqueness
might insist that the agents in question do not actually share evidence; there must be
a difference in evidence to justify a difference in attitudes. If the permissivist insists
that they do share evidence, then the advocate of uniqueness will conclude that one
of them is irrational.
10 Main defenders of permissivism include Ballantyne and Coffman (2011), Kelly (2013), Meacham
(2014) and Schoenfield (2014, 2018).
11 In the context of the belief/credence relationship, a more precise way to state the permissivist thesis
would be that, given a body of evidence, there is more than one rational doxastic attitude of a particular
type. This modification is needed because the view that a body of evidence permits a particular credence
and a particular belief-attitude at the same time is not sufficient to count as permissivism. For example,
my evidence might uniquely determine that I ought to have both a 0.9 credence in p and believe p; this
does not entail permissivism. Thanks to Geoffrey Hall.
12 Main defenders of uniqueness include White (2005, 2013), Feldman (2007), Hedden (2015), Greco
and Hedden (2016) and Dogramaci and Horowitz (2016).
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2.2 Implications of the belief/credence relationship
Implicit in the above discussion is a distinction between two types of permissivism:
Credal permissivism Possibly, a body of evidence permits more than one rational
credal-attitude.
Belief permissivism Possibly, a body of evidence permits more than one rational
belief-attitude.
To see how these come apart, note that one could consistently maintain credal
permissivism but deny belief permissivism. It might be that sometimes, a body of
evidence permits more than one credence, but always requires one of the three
belief-attitudes (belief that p, withholding belief, or belief that not-p).13 The
evidence could allow one to believe p and have a credence of 0.8 or to believe p and
have a credence of 0.9, but not allow for withholding belief or belief that not-p.
Before discussing how views on the relationship between belief and credence
constrain the permissivism debate, it is worth noting that on the traditional fine-
grained credence model, credal uniqueness seems implausible. If credal uniqueness
is true, then there is a single, fine-grained rational credence for a body of evidence.
But it seems overly demanding to insist that I am irrational if I don’t adopt a
credence of, e.g. 0.675, given my evidence.14 Thus, at least at first blush, credal
permissivism seems more plausible that credal uniqueness.
Let’s then suppose credal permissivism is true, and further suppose that a credence-
first view of the relationship between belief and credence is true. On this view, one’s
evidence would sometimes permit a range of rational credences, and belief would be a
matter of having a credence above a particular threshold. This seems to lend itself to
belief permissivism, as there seems to be no principled reason to think that the range of
permitted credences could not straddle the threshold for belief. Thus, it seems natural
to think that the conjunction of credence-first and credal permissivism (which is
independently plausible) entails belief permissivism.15
Belief-first and dualism do not as obviously lend themselves to belief
permissivism, so some who are attracted to uniqueness may want to adopt one of
these views of the belief-credence relationship instead. Further, uniqueness about
belief does not seem as prima facie implausible as uniqueness about credence, so
whether belief permissivism is true seems like a more substantive question than
whether credal permissivism is true.16 Thus, the belief-first and dualist views might
provide a more interesting model on which to debate permissivism; e.g. could
13 One might also deny credal permissivism but maintain belief permissivism. For example, one might be
a pragmatist about rational belief, so rational belief is a matter of both stakes and evidence, but be a purist
and uniquer about credences, such that rational credence mirrors, and is solely determined by, one’s
evidence. Thanks to Michael Hatcher.
14 See Kelly (2013), Douven (2009), Schoenfield (2014) and Decker (2012).
15 Thanks to Michael Hatcher.
16 As Kelly (2013) points out, an alternative route for defenders of uniqueness is to appeal to fuzzy or
interval credences. I discuss other kinds of mental states besides belief and precise credences briefly in the
conclusion (Sect. 7).
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rationality and a body of evidence ever permit both believing p and withholding
with respect to p?
Further, on a dualist picture, credal permissivism and belief permissivism can
potentially come apart quite a bit. Of course, this will partially depend on whether
there are normative connections between belief and credence (for example, whether
the Lockean thesis is true, and rational belief that p requires a rational credence in p
above some threshold). However, dualism is merely a descriptive, rather than a
normative thesis, and this allows for multiple combinations of views about
permissivism (permissivism about one attitude, uniqueness about the other,
permissivism about both, uniqueness about both, etc.).
3 Disagreement
3.1 Steadfastness and conciliationism
How should we respond to disagreement? Should we alter our opinion in someway?Or
is it fine to maintain our previously held opinion? The disagreement debate concerns
these questions. Central to this debate is the concept of an epistemic peer—roughly,
someonewho is your epistemic equal. (For example, according toKelly, epistemic peers
have approximately the same evidence and the same epistemic virtues).17
There are two primary positions in the disagreement debate. Conciliationists
maintain that themere fact that an epistemic peer disagrees with you is a reason to alter
your doxastic attitudes in someway. For example, suppose you and your friend, who is
equally good at math as you (i.e. your epistemic peer) are at a restaurant, trying to
figure out how to split the bill. You both calculate separately, and you determine that
the cost is $22 a person, while they calculate that it is $26 a person. Intuitively, you
should not dogmatically believe you are right and they arewrong; you shouldwithhold
belief and/or lower your credence in your previously held opinion, as you have no
reason to think that you are more reliable than your friend.18
The other position in this debate is steadfastness, or the view that the mere fact a peer
disagrees with you is not always a reason to alter your doxastic attitudes in some way.
Steadfastersmay think that, in somecases, peer disagreement should cause us toalter our
attitudes, e.g. because disagreement functions as higher-order evidence against a
previously held opinion.19 However, steadfasters think it is at least sometimes, if not
often, appropriate instead to remain true to your previous opinion, even in the face of
peer disagreement. For example, we encounter peers daily who disagree with us on
political and religious matters, but it doesn’t seem irrational to nonethelessmaintain our
political and religious convictions, even with high confidence.
17 Kelly (2005). There are different, incompatible notions of peerhood in the disagreement literature;
another notion of peerhood that centers around reliability is found in Elga (2007: 487). I mention Kelly’s
definition to give the reader a general understanding of what being an epistemic peer amounts to, but
nothing in my argument turns on adopting a particular view of peerhood.
18 See Christensen (2007, 2009, 2016).
19 Kelly (2005).
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3.2 Implications of the belief/credence relationship
Suppose that a belief-first view is true, and beliefs are the fundamental attitude.
Suppose also that conciliationism is true, and that we should change our doxastic
attitudes in the face of peer disagreement. The combination of these two views
actually leads to some puzzles. The coarse-grained nature of a belief-first view
makes it difficult to see what conciliating would look like. Recall that there are only
three belief-like attitudes one can take toward a proposition. If I believe p and you,
my peer, believe not-p, then it seems like we should both withhold belief. But what
if I believe p and you withhold? Or if I withhold and you believe not-p? If
conciliationism is a matter of altering one’s attitudes, it is unclear what this change
ought to look like—there is no intermediary attitude.
One potential way to solve this puzzle is to suggest that conciliating in cases like
these should involve changing the content that is believed, rather than changing
one’s attitude toward a particular proposition. For example, if I believe p and you
withhold, maybe I should neither believe p nor withhold, but instead form a new
belief with the content ‘‘probably p.’’ This suggestion is both interesting and
puzzling. It is interesting because conciliationism ends up amounting to ‘‘trading’’
one belief for another, rather than altering one’s attitude toward a particular content.
At the same time, it raises a number of questions, most notably, what attitude should
one take toward the original proposition p? It seems inappropriate for me to believe
p or withhold, and I definitely shouldn’t believe not-p. Is there an additional
perspective, having-no-attitude-at-all toward p, where p is a proposition you have
considered? Maybe, but talk of such an attitude is rare, if not virtually absent, from
the literature20; further, it is unclear that this is the appropriate attitude for me to
take toward p in this situation. There is room for further work on how one would
combine a belief-first view with conciliationism.
Suppose instead that credence-first is true. Prima facie, it might seem as though a
credence-first view lends itself nicely to conciliationism, because whenever you
encounter a peer who disagrees with you, you can simply average your credence
with theirs and ‘‘split the difference’’ with them. However, on closer examination, a
credence-first conciliationist view may not be so straightforward. Consider a case
for Christensen.
I am a doctor determining what dosage of a drug to give my patient. I’m
initially inclined to be very confident in my conclusion, but knowing my own
fallibility in calculation, I pull back a bit, say, to 0.97. I also decide to ask my
equally qualified colleague for an independent opinion. I do so in the
Conciliatory spirit of using her reasoning as a check on my own. Now suppose
I find out that she has arrived – presumably in a way that also takes into
account her fallibility – at 0.96 credence in the same dosage.21
20 One exception is Friedman (2013b: 170).
21 Christensen (2009: 759).
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In this case, you are technically encountering peer disagreement, as your colleague
is less confident in the proposition than you. According to the split the difference
view, you should be slightly less confident that you should give that dosage to your
patient (i.e. alter your credence to 0.965). However, Christensen concludes that ‘‘it
seems that the rational thing to do is for me to increase my confidence that this is the
correct dosage, not decrease it as difference-splitting would require.’’22 Even though
she is less confident than you are, she is confident enough that it confirms, rather
than calls into question, your conclusion about the dosage.
Of course, not all will share Christensen’s intuitions about this case, but I do think
there are more general lessons to be learned. First, as Christensen notes, ‘‘mechanical
difference splitting with peers’’ in a credence framework might not straightforwardly
apply in every case.23 Second, the fine-grained nature of credencesmay, in some cases,
make it seem like there is disagreement when the situation is better described as one of
agreement. Consider another example: suppose I hold an unpopular view in
philosophy with a credence of 0.95, and I am discouraged because everyone I
encounter seems to reject my view. Then, I meet someone else with a 0.90 credence in
that view. I will likely experience comfort and happiness to find someone who shares
my inclinations, and Iwould probably even describe them as someonewho agreeswith
me. It seems unlikely that I would spend a lot of time focusing on the fact that I am
slightly more confident than they are. Thus, when the attitudes in question are
extremely fine-grained, agreement and disagreement start to blur together, and the
proper way to conciliate with epistemic peers may not be straightforward.
Finally, suppose that dualism is true. Then, it seems as though conciliationism
and steadfastness can be combined in interesting ways. For example, one might be a
steadfaster about belief but a conciliationist about credence.24 Further, if one thinks
there is a normative relationship between the attitudes, it might be that
conciliationism is fundamentally true of one attitude, but derivatively true of
another; e.g. the only reason one ought to alter one’s beliefs in response to
disagreement is in virtue of the fact that one ought to alter one’s credences, as it is
irrational to alter one’s credences drastically without a change in one’s beliefs.25
4 Pragmatic encroachment
4.1 Pragmatism and purism
The pragmatic encroachment debate is about whether practical interests can affect
the epistemic rationality of particular kinds of mental states.26 Early in the
debate, most people were focusing on whether practical factors can affect
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Thanks to Lara Buchak.
25 Thanks to Zoe Johnson King.
26 For a nice survey of the pragmatic encroachment debate, see Kim (2017).
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knowledge,27 but lately, many have been focusing on whether the practical can
affect epistemic justification.28 (Of course, the practical might affect knowledge
by affecting epistemic justification, so these foci are not mutually exclusive and
are even potentially complementary). Since this paper concerns beliefs and
credences, I will focus on the ways that the practical might affect epistemic
justification or epistemic rationality, as justification/rationality apply more
straightforwardly to beliefs and credences than does knowledge.29
Pragmatists argue that epistemic justification depends, at least in part, on the
practical. Purists deny this and maintain that epistemic justification is not
affected by our practical interests. One traditional example to motivate
pragmatism is as follows. Suppose that Hannah is driving home on a Friday
afternoon, and plans to stop by the bank to deposit a check. There is no urgency
to deposit this check, and Hannah drives by the bank and notices the lines are
extremely long. She remembers that she was at the bank a few weeks ago on a
Saturday, and thus justifiedly believes/has a high credence that the bank is open
tomorrow.
In the second version of the case, Hannah is also driving home on a Friday
afternoon and plans to stop by to deposit a check at the bank. She also sees very long
lines when she drives by the bank. However, she has very little money in her
account and her mortgage payment is due Monday. If she doesn’t get the check
deposited by that weekend, she will default on her mortgage and go bankrupt. She
has the memory of being at the bank a few weeks ago on a Saturday, but she also
knows her memory is fallible and banks do change their hours. It seems like Hannah
does not have justification to believe/have a high credence that the bank is open,
even though the epistemic aspects of the case remain the same. Thus, at least in
some cases, it seems like stakes alone can affect the rationality of our doxastic
attitudes.30
Purists resist this verdict and offer an alternative explanation for our differing
intuitions. For example, our intuitions might not clearly distinguish epistemic
justification to believe/have a high credence that the bank is open tomorrow, and
practical justification to act as if the bank is open tomorrow. There is also a
correlation between stakes and how much evidence it seems one ought to gather
before taking action, so our intuitions might be the result of a confusion between
epistemic justification and duties to gather evidence before acting.31
27 See Hawthorne (2003), Stanley (2005) and Fantl and McGrath (2002, 2010).
28 See Schroeder (2012) and Ross and Schroeder (2014). Further, Fantl and McGrath (2002, 2010) also
talk quite a bit about pragmatic encroachment on epistemic justification.
29 One reason for this is because it is controversial whether credences can be knowledge or knowledge-
like. For an argument that credences can amount to knowledge, see Moss (2013, 2018).
30 These cases are adopted from Stanley (2005: 3–4).
31 See Nagel (2008, 2010a).
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4.2 Implications of the Belief/Credence Relationship
There are two ways one might be a pragmatist:
Credal pragmatism The justification/rationality of a credence depends, at least in
part, on practical interests.32
Belief pragmatism The justification/rationality of a belief depends, at least in
part, on practical interests.
There are also two ways to be a purist: credal purism (the denial of credal
pragmatism) and belief purism (the denial of belief pragmatism). Our judgments
about these theses will depend on the relationship between belief and credence.
Suppose credence-first is true, and beliefs are a type of credence. It might seem
that purism about credence would entail purism about belief—if rational credence
isn’t affected by the practical, and belief is just a matter of having a certain
credence, then it would seem that rational beliefs aren’t affected by the practical,
either. However, recall that on a credence-first view, belief is a function of both
one’s credence and also a threshold required to count as believing. Thus, certain
credence-first views can actually maintain both credal purism and belief pragma-
tism, if practical factors can affect the threshold for belief.33 For example, in a low
stakes scenario, one might only need a 0.7 credence for rational belief, but if the
stakes go up, one might need a 0.9 credence for rational belief. If, on the other hand,
the threshold for belief does not vary with stakes, this would make space for a
credence-first view that is purist about both belief and credence.
A belief-first view does not seem to be as flexible. Given belief-first, pragmatism
about belief seems to lend itself to pragmatism about credence (and vice versa), and
purism about belief seems to lend itself to purism about credence (and vice versa).
Recall that according to belief-first, credences are just a matter of having beliefs
with a particular content. It would be very odd if pragmatism were true about beliefs
with certain contents but not other contents; it seems like pragmatism and purism
ought to apply equally to both beliefs and credences, given belief-first.
Finally, suppose dualism is true. Dualism seems to allow for multiple
combinations of belief pragmatism, credal pragmatism, belief purism, and credal
purism. What combinations of views one can maintain will, again, depend on
whether there are normative connections between belief and credence.
It is also worth noting that dualism can potentially offer a unique purist
explanation for pragmatist intuitions. Recall that on the dualist view, we have both
beliefs and credences, and many dualists maintain that beliefs and credences are two
epistemic tools used for different purposes.34 There is additional psychological
evidence that beliefs are useful in low-stakes scenarios, when we can assume certain
32 Some authors who mention or discuss this view include Stanley (2005: 88–89), Armendt (2007), Kim
(2017: 7), Hajek and Lin (2017: 226), Moss (forthcoming) and Sturgeon (forthcoming).
33 Defenders of this view include Weatherson (2005), Ganson (2008), Fantl and McGrath (2010) and
Pace (2011). For objections to this view, see Ross and Schroeder (2014).
34 See Staffel (2017) and Weisberg (forthcoming).
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propositions in our reasoning but still reason accurately enough for our aims. For
instance: it may be completely appropriate for me to believe my office mate,
Rachel, is in the philosophy building because I saw her coat and backpack in the
office, and rely on this belief if a friend casually asks me if Rachel is in today. On
the other hand, credences are useful in high stakes cases, where precision and
accuracy in reasoning are especially important. Returning to our example, if police
are investigating a murder in the philosophy department and require a detailed list of
everyone in the building that day, I ought to consider the possibility that Rachel was
not actually in that day, since I never actually saw her, only her coat and
backpack.35 Instead of believing and taking for granted that Rachel was in today, I
should reason using my credence that she was in the building; this keeps the
possibilities open and allows for a more accurate representation of my evidential
situation.36
Thus, it is open to the dualist to say that when the stakes rise, you shouldn’t give
up the relevant belief; you just shouldn’t rely on it in reasoning. Instead, you should
rely on your credence. Higher stakes call for more detailed, thoughtful reasoning,
i.e. credence reasoning. But that you shouldn’t use belief-reasoning doesn’t entail
you ought to give up the belief; rational belief doesn’t depend on practical interests,
but whether you should rely on a belief does.37
5 Doxastic voluntarism
5.1 Voluntarism and involuntarism
The doxastic voluntarism debate primarily concerns the question of whether we can
ever have direct control over our doxastic attitudes. Direct control is the same kind
of control we have over raising our hand; what precisely this kind of control
amounts to is controversial.38 However, we can, via an agential act, raise our hand
straightforwardly and directly; we can also choose not to raise our hand.
Voluntarists maintain that, at least sometimes, we can control our doxastic attitudes
in this way. Involuntarists deny that our doxastic attitudes can ever be controlled
directly.39
35 This case is adapted from DeRose (2009).
36 See Webster and Kruglanski (1994, 1996), Nagel (2008, 2010a, b), Kahneman (2013) and Staffel
(2017).
37 This argument is further developed in Jackson (MS).
38 As Hieronymi (2006: 48) points out, direct control and basic actions come apart.
39 Arguments for involuntarism include Williams (1970), Winters (1979), Alston (1988), Bennett (1990),
Scott-Kakures (1994), Hieronymi (2006, 2009), Setiya (2008). Arguments for voluntarism include
Radcliffe (1997), Ginet (2001), Shah (2002). See also Audi (2001), Feldman (2001), Ryan (2003) and
Steup (2008).
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5.2 Implications of the belief/credence relationship
We can distinguish two ways voluntarism might be true:
Belief voluntarism Possibly, we have direct/voluntary control over our beliefs.
Credal voluntarism Possibly, we have direct/voluntary control over our
credences.
How do various views on the belief-credence relationship affect what one might
conclude about these types of voluntarism?
Suppose that credence-first is true. Then, the fundamental question in the
doxastic voluntarism debate seems to be over whether credal voluntarism is true.
However, the doxastic voluntarism literature has primarily concerned the attitude of
belief, rather than the attitude of credence.40 While many philosophers seem
unsympathetic to the idea that we could directly control our credences, few have
discussed this in print or provided arguments for this conclusion. One exception is
that some have suggested that we can’t control our credences because credence
simply tracks the amount of evidential support we have for a particular
proposition.41 However, it is still a relatively unexplored question whether credal
voluntarism is plausible.
But supposing credal voluntarism is implausible, what would a credence-first
view say about belief voluntarism? While this may seem to imply that belief
voluntarism is also implausible, there is at least one potential way to preserve belief
voluntarism. If, somehow, we could control the threshold for belief, strict
involuntarism could be true of credences, but we could control whether we believe
by moving the threshold around. In some ways, this suggestion is similar to the one
in Sect. 4.2 on which pragmatic factors can set the threshold for belief. The big
question for this view seems to be whether it is plausible that we could directly
control this threshold.
On a belief-first view, credal voluntarism and belief voluntarism seem to stand or
fall together. If we can directly control some of our beliefs, it seems ad hoc to
suggest we cannot directly control our beliefs with probabilistic content (at least it is
unclear what would motivate this). Further, if we do not have direct control over our
beliefs, then it seems like we would not have direct control over our probabilistic
beliefs, either.
Dualism, by contrast, allows for more combinations of views. On a dualist
picture, it seems like one could maintain belief voluntarism but deny credal
voluntarism, or maintain credal voluntarism but deny belief voluntarism. And unlike
the credence-first view, this wouldn’t require the ability to directly control the
threshold for belief. Thus, on a dualist picture, one could maintain strict credal
involuntarism but nonetheless hold that sometimes, we can directly control whether
or not we believe the proposition in question.
40 One exception to this is Pittard (MS).
41 Thanks to Lara Buchak.
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6 Doxastic attitudes and rational action
6.1 Two models of rational action
What makes an action rational? At least two different models have been developed
in order to answer this question. The first is decision theory. On an orthodox
decision theory model, an action is rational iff it maximizes expected value.42 The
second is a belief-desire model; i.e. an action is rational iff it is appropriate given
one’s beliefs and desires.43 The main use for these models (at least in a
philosophical context) is to give a normative theory of action—a theory that
explains how one ought to act.44 For example, suppose it is rational for me to go to
the library. On a decision theory picture, this is because my utility function is such
that I value getting work done, and, given the ways the world might be, going to the
library results in the best outcome, given my utility function. On a belief-desire
picture, this action will be rational because I desire to get work done, I believe being
at the library provides a quiet work environment, I believe in the past I’ve been
productive when I’ve gone to the library, etc.
Note that both of these models involve an epistemic component and an
axiological component. Decision theory takes probabilities (or credences) and
utilities as inputs. The belief-desire model takes beliefs and desires as inputs. Both
of these (and most other models of rational action as well) require some kind of
input that represents the world or says something about what the world is like.
6.2 Implications of the belief/credence relationship
Given that rational action requires us to represent the world in a particular way,
questions arise about the way beliefs and/or credences play a role in how we ought
to act. How will one’s commitments on the relationship between belief and credence
affect one’s views on the rationality of action? Do some views on belief and
credence push us toward one model or another?
Suppose a credence-first view is true. Credence-first seems, at least prima facie,
conducive to a decision theory model of rational action, as decision theory takes
credences as inputs. One worry for this combination of views, however, is that there
is psychological evidence we often fail (in serious and predictable ways) to
maximize expected value.45 We fail at least partially because efficiency is often
important in our decision-making processes, and when the stakes are quite low and/
or we have to make a decision quickly, it doesn’t make sense to do an expected
value calculation; this would require too much mental work.46 A decision-theorist
42 See Briggs (2014).
43 See Davidson (1963) and Bratman (1987).
44 Some (especially economists) additionally use them as descriptive theories, to explain action (rational
or irrational), but using the models for this purpose is less common among philosophers.
45 See Kahneman and Tversky (1982).
46 See Weisberg (forthcoming).
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might respond that the fact that we fail to maximize expected value doesn’t count
against decision theory as a normative theory. Decision theory is a theory about
ideal prudential rationality, not one that is meant to describe how we actually
reason. This response makes sense, but there is still a worry in the neighborhood: is
it plausible for agents like us to be guided by decision theory in all of our decision
making? One might worry this an unrealistic prescription, given our cognitive
limitations. In other words, one might worry that if decision theory is supposed to be
an action-guiding norm for prudential rationality, using it for all decision making is
too complex or requires too much mental effort.47
If one takes this sort of worry seriously, it might motivate the idea that a belief-
desire model of decision making is better suited to guide action for cognitively
limited agents like us. A belief-desire model seems to fit nicely with the belief-first
view, as it takes beliefs, rather than credences, as inputs. While this might guide
action more realistically, given our cognitive limitations, the belief-desire model
faces other worries. For example, there are cases where it is rational to act as if some
proposition is true when one doesn’t believe it or believes it is false. Suppose you
are trying to decide whether allow your children to skate on a frozen lake. You
believe the ice is solid, but you also realize there’s a chance it is not. It might be
rational to act as if the ice will crack and tell your children they cannot skate, even
despite your belief the ice is solid. In a second case, suppose your brother has been
missing for multiple months. There is a lot of evidence he is dead; so much
evidence, in fact, you believe he is dead. However, you also know there’s some
chance you’re wrong—there’s a chance he’s still alive, and for this reason, you
don’t give up hope, and you continue to search for him and try to get in contact with
him. In both of these cases, you believe p, but acting as if not-p is rational for you,
because (i) there is a non-zero chance that not-p and (ii) the stakes are sufficiently
high. There are many other cases with a similar stricture; most cases of rational
acceptance without belief will fit into this category.48 Probabilistic models of
rational action, e.g. decision theory, seem more conducive to capturing the
rationality of this kind of action.
A proponent of the belief-desire model/a belief-firster might respond by saying
that cases like these are ones in which our probabilistic beliefs come into play.
While you believe p in these cases, you also believe there is a non-zero chance that
not-p, and you are acting on the basis of this second belief.49 This helps with the
problem, but there is also the question of why you ought to act on the basis of your
probabilistic belief there is a non-zero chance that not-p instead of your belief that
p. Decision theory gives a nice answer to this question; it is clearly captured in the
formal model. However, at least prima facie, on the belief-desire model, it is not
clear why one ought to act on the probabilistic belief rather than the non-
probabilistic one.
47 Although a potential rejoinder here is that one’s action is rational iff one can be represented as
maximizing expected value. See Lewis (1974: 337).
48 See Cohen (2000).
49 For some work on how beliefs might guide action without credences, see Hawthorne and Stanley
(2008), Lin (2013) and Easwaran (2015: 19).
2490 E. G. Jackson
123
Author's personal copy
Finally, suppose dualism is true and we have both beliefs and credences and
neither is fundamental. Some have worried that dualism is subject to the ‘‘Bayesian
Challenge.’’50 The Bayesian Challenge is the worry that we do not need both beliefs
and credences to explain the rationality of action (among other things). Credences
alone seem to do quite well. If beliefs make the same prescriptions as credences,
they seem superfluous; if they make different ones, we should trust those made by
our credences (because, for example, it can be rational to act as if not-p even though
we believe p, as discussed above). Thus, beliefs are either unnecessary for decision
making or guide us in the wrong direction.51
Several attempts to meet the Bayesian Challenge have been offered. Ross and
Schroeder, for example, suggest that beliefs are the things that determine which
possibilities one is considering in one’s decision making. When S believes p, p is
true in every state of the world in S’s decision matrix. For agents like us, it is
impossible to consider every possibility, so beliefs make reasoning manageable.52
Weisberg and Staffel suggest that we never reason with our belief in p and
our credence in p at the same time, so when beliefs (rationally) play a role in our
reasoning, it is because (for various reasons) we ought to rely on our belief rather
than our credence.53 Along similar lines, Moon has suggested that it is possible for
agents to have a belief that p without a credence that p.54 If Moon is right, it seems
as though agents who believe p without a credence must utilize their belief that p in
order to reason about p and act on p. Whether these various attempts to meet the
Bayesian Challenge are successful is a judgment I will leave to the reader, but at
minimum, it is not obvious that the Bayesian Challenge is devastating for dualism.
7 Conclusion
I conclude with some areas of further research. First, I have only considered the
relationship between two kinds of attitudes: categorical beliefs and precise
credences. However, epistemologists have recently suggested there might be other
kinds of attitudes as well: imprecise/fuzzy/interval credences,55 attitudes of
comparative confidence,56 etc. Including these attitudes in the debates could open
up even more possibilities. For example, if uniqueness and credence-first are in
tension, one might include fuzzy or interval credences in the domain of possible
attitudes, and maintain that the evidence determines a unique fuzzy credence (even
if it doesn’t determine a unique precise credence).57 I have avoided talking about
50 See Kaplan (1996), Stalnaker (1984), Sturgeon (2008) and Frankish (2009).
51 See Weisberg (forthcoming).
52 Ross and Schroeder (2014), Tang (2015) and Staffel (2018).
53 Staffel (2017) and Weisberg (forthcoming).
54 Moon (forthcoming).
55 See Rothschild (2012), Schoenfield (2012, 2015) and Konek (forthcoming).
56 See Carter et al. (2016).
57 See Kelly (2013).
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this kind of move for the sake of space, but this is one potential way to expand my
project. Also, if something about a particular debate in epistemology pushes us to
adopt a more coarse-grained attitude, there is a question of when we should move to
categorical belief, and when it might be better to instead move to an interval/fuzzy
credence. More research could be done on this question.
A second view I have not considered is eliminativism. On both belief-first and
credence-first, one attitude is reduced to the other, but on both views, the reduced
attitude still exists. However, one might maintain, for example, that our concept of
belief is a leftover from folk psychology, and there is no reason to hold that beliefs
are psychologically real. Belief is not high credence or certainty; beliefs just do not
exist.58 One could maintain a similar view of credence (although I am not aware of
anyone who has argued for eliminativism about credence).59 Eliminativism about
belief or credence might have different implications for these debates than
reductionism; this is another area where further research is needed.
I conclude that the relationship between belief and credence is a significant one
for epistemology, and one to which epistemologists should pay closer attention. It is
also worth noting that answering questions about the relationship between belief and
credence involves much philosophy of mind; in fact, it may be primarily a
philosophy of mind question. Further, exploring the belief-credence relationship
might also require diving into psychology and looking at what view of belief and
credence is best supported by the empirical evidence.60 Thus, insofar as the
relationship between belief and credence is a philosophy of mind/empirical
question, epistemologists ought to be branching out into other fields.61
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